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Summary. There is an administrative reluctance to recognise the permanency of urban settle-
ment in Papua New Guinea. This reluctance, evident since the 1960s, has been characteristic of
both the colonial and post-colonial administrations. Opposition to some facets of urbanisation
continues today, despite growing population and land pressures in most rural areas and real
problems of landlessness emerging in particular rural areas. Colonial control of urban popula-
tions has been replicated in contemporary times, often in more draconian form. Eviction of urban
settlers has been tied to issues of crime and urban respectability, and lingering perceptions that
Melanesians should be rural residents. The growth of informal settlements and urbanisation are
not seen as issues of urban planning, nor is the context of urban migration linked to socioeco-
nomic inequality, hence other forms of urban policy are largely absent. Strengthening alliances
between land-owners and the state (especially police and provincial administrations) have thus
emphasised intraurban inequality and hampered national development.
Introduction
Urbanisation in Papua New Guinea is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. Until the early
1960s, towns and cities in Papua New
Guinea were primarily European colonial ad-
ministrative centres. Presently, Papua New
Guinea’s urban population accounts for 15
per cent of the national population, which is
lower than in other Melanesian and Paci c
Island nations (Ward, 1997). Despite the
relatively limited extent of urbanisation,
the rate of urban population growth since the
1960s has been, at times, extraordinarily
high. Between 1966 and 1971, Papua New
Guinea’s urban population grew at over 16
per cent per annum (Jackson, 1977). Since
1980, the rate of urbanisation has slowed
with growth concentrated in the three largest
cities of Port Moresby, Lae and Madang
(Connell, 1997) (Figure 1). Port Moresby’s
annual growth rate from 1980 to 1990 was
5.3 per cent (National Statistical Of ce,
1994) and that growth continued at around
this rate throughout the 1990s.1
From the early colonial period, a pervasive
anti-urbanism and an administrative reluc-
tance to recognise the permanency of urban
settlement have been at the heart of Papua
New Guinea’s national development policy
and practice. Urbanisation was slow in col-
onial times and Michael Somare, just prior to
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becoming the  rst Prime Minister of Papua
New Guinea on its independence in 1975,
posed the rhetorical question
Do we really want to become a country of
big cities? In all the 700 languages of our
country we have never needed words for
air pollution, for slum or for unemploy-
ment. Do we wish to build the kind of
country that needs these words? (Somare,
1973, p. 2).
Opposition to cities has been manifest in
policies opposing migration to the towns,
more often out of implausible attempts to
preserve an aura of urban respectability by
reducing the visible evidence of urban
unemployment than out of any desire for
rural development (Connell, 1997). In col-
onial times, there were  rm administrative
restrictions on rural-to-urban migration, par-
ticularly on the establishment of informal
settlements in urban areas. In the post-col-
onial era, efforts to restrict rural-to-urban
migration and curtail urbanisation continued
as of cials inherited the assumptions of col-
onial administrators, who perceived Melane-
sians as rural residents, and were reluctant to
recognise both the necessity and inevitability
of some degree of urbanisation.
In the past decade, anti-urban sentiments
have again intensi ed and urban growth is
increasingly being cast as a law-and-order
issue. Evictions from informal settlements
and intermittent calls for the colonial Va-
grancy Act to be reintroduced have been
prominent administrative responses to con-
tinued urban growth and growing law-and-
order problems, especially as urban crime is
now considered to be a major factor deterring
foreign investment and business in Papua
New Guinea (Levantis, 2000). Fierce oppo-
sition to urban growth and the violent nature
of evictions signal the emergence of a dis-
turbing trend towards the use of paramilitary
style responses to increasingly complex and
seemingly unmanageable urban ‘problems’.
Evictions are legitimised by a ‘war on crime’
rhetoric leading to knee-jerk reactions to ur-
ban development ‘problems’ without the
need for recourse to considered and sustain-
able urban planning policies. These new
trends suggest that issues of urbanisation and
urban development have become crime is-
sues divorced from their socioeconomic and
spatial contexts. This paper traces these shifts
in the form of opposition to urbanisation,
especially the increasingly violent nature of
evictions, and links them to broader pro-
cesses of change occurring in Papua New
Guinea society, particularly the weakening of
the state. We  nally explore the implications
for evicted residents, many of whom are
from economically marginal rural areas and
have been urban residents for many years.
Urbanisation Policies during the Colonial
Period
Throughout Melanesia, but especially in
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and
New Hebrides (Vanuatu), there were exten-
sive attempts to regulate and control mi-
gration to towns in the pre-war and post-war
years (Oram, 1970; Connell and Curtain,
1982; Connell and Lea, 1993; Jourdan, 1995;
Rawlings, 1999). In the colonial era, regula-
tions controlling employment and the mo-
bility of wage labour were enforced and it
was illegal for the indigenous Melanesian
population to live in town without either a
job or a permit.2 Restrictions on movements
into towns in Papua New Guinea were intro-
duced as early as 1914 with the Native
Labour Regulations. Together with a range
of other colonial legislation such as the
Police Offenders Ordinance 1919–1939
(Papua), the Health Regulations 1922
(Papua), the Public Health Ordinance 1932–
1938 (New Guinea) and building ordinances,
these laws served to exclude the indigenous
population from the urban landscape (Jack-
son, 1977). The Port Moresby community of
1921 was “predominantly white” (Inglis,
1974, p. 27). During the 1920s, whistles or
bells sounded at 8am and 9pm; between
these hours Melanesians were allowed to be
in town. Through the 1950s, there were cur-
fews on the presence of Melanesians in town.
As late as 1970, Port Moresby was still
described as a largely European town in
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Table 1. Urban centres, 1966–90
1966 1971 1980 1990
Port Moresby (NCD) 41 848 76 507 117 991 194 295
Lae 16 546 38 707 60 708 80 655
Madang 8 837 15 296 19 718 27 057
Wewak 8 945 14 982 19 408 23 224
Mt Hagen 3 315 10 621 13 192 18 977
Goroka 4 826 8 186 11 067 18 368
Rabaul 10 561 12 770 14 581 18 186
Daru 3 663 5 744 7 149 8 490
Kimbe — 1 172 4 659 8 363
Vanimo 512 1 064 1 752 7 908
Popondetta 2 139 4 494 6 343 7 627
Bulolo 2 724 4 001 4 500 7 421
Kavieng 2 142 3 299 4 769 6 486
Alotau 525 2 499 4 311 6 435
Mendi 1 687 2 435 4 130 6 192
Lorengau 2 446 2 890 3 588 5 804
All urban 110 716 204 667 297 866 445 488
Sources: Connell (1985, p. 92) and Connell (1997, p. 189).
character with its political and economic
spheres dominated by Europeans (Oram,
1970). Until the late 1970s, the towns in
Papua New Guinea, and elsewhere in
Melanesia, were essentially colonial adminis-
trative centres, a legacy that continued into
the post-colonial era.
The various legislative restrictions for dis-
couraging movement into cities and towns in
Papua New Guinea were based on a set of
assumptions regarding indigenous urban set-
tlers. The most important of these were that
urban settlers were temporary male sojourn-
ers whose families and ‘true’ homes were in
the village and whose presence in town
would lead to moral decline and law-and-
order problems. These assumptions under-
pinned the restrictions on movement and also
in uenced wage structures, accommodation
provision for employees and the practice of
compulsory repatriation after a period of em-
ployment (see Ward, 1980; Connell, 1985;
Ryan, 1989). Until 1972, for example, urban
wages were calculated on the basis of sup-
porting only a single man, and most migrants
were housed by their employers who pro-
vided only single men’s quarters (Curtain,
1980). The compulsory repatriation of em-
ployees, a relic of the plantation economy
and based on the assumption that workers
were only temporary urban sojourners, also
discouraged permanent urban settlement
(Connell, 1985). Administrators at the time
viewed squatter and informal settlements as
transitory features of the urban landscape;
indeed, as Ward (1998, p. 22) has pointed out
for colonial administrators in the late
1960s and 1970s it was comforting to
think that urban in-migrants to towns, seen
as potential problems, were just there tem-
porarily.
Rapid urban growth in the late 1960s and
especially in the 1970s challenged the as-
sumption that urban migrants were there
temporarily (Table 1).3 Moreover, the val-
idity of the assumption of temporary urban
migration was questioned as early as the mid
1960s when urban permanence was  rst ac-
knowledged (see, for example, Ryan, 1966;
Hitchcock and Oram, 1967; Oram, 1968;
1970; Ward, 1971; Young, 1977). These
studies alluded to the prolonged residence
periods of settlers in towns (Ryan, 1966;
Hitchcock and Oram, 1967), the increasing
number of children born in town and the
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Table 2. Rural and urban wage differentials
Minimum cash-equivalent wage, unskilled workers ($/week.)
Year Rural Urban Differential (%)
1961 4.61 6.00 30
1964 4.61 6.50 41
1967 4.86 6.50 34
1970 4.86 7.00 44
1973 5.90 13.80 134
1976 9.50 29.00 205
Source: Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Incomes, Wages and Prices Policy,
February 1974; cited in Jackson (1977, p. 24).
gradual balancing of sex ratios, all suggest-
ing a more stable and permanent population
(Ward, 1971). As Oram (1970, p. 63) noted
at the time
It seems probable that over the next 20
years an increasing proportion of the urban
population will come to regard Port
Moresby as their permanent place of resi-
dence.
That prediction came true.
The Lead Up to Independence
Beginning in the 1960s, and into the immedi-
ate post-independence period, the gradual re-
moval of restrictions on movement,
relatively higher urban wages, employment
growth and an expansion in government
spending on welfare provision, increased the
attraction of urban employment and resi-
dence. A more tolerant and less negative
approach to urban life led to an of cial reluc-
tance to enforce what was in effect a ‘pass
system’ and a gradual reduction in the vigi-
lance attached to searching out ‘vagrants’
(Oram, 1976), although intolerance of infor-
mal settlements in Port Moresby remained an
issue.4 However, overall, somewhat more en-
lightened and realistic attitudes towards ur-
banisation in the period leading up to
independence in 1975 tended to promote ur-
ban planning and rapid urbanisation (Forbes
and Jackson, 1975; Connell, 1985). Increas-
ing urban–rural wage differentials (Table 2)
and the migration of women to urban centres
also led to an expansion of urban family life
and the development of a more stable work-
force (Jackson, 1977).
At this time, the number of informal settle-
ments in Port Moresby increased (Matwijiw,
1982) as government and private employers
failed to provide suf cient housing to keep
pace with the growing numbers of migrant
workers and their families. Initially, nearly
all the settlements were located on customary
land with most residents being from the Port
Moresby region and having some prior tra-
ditional trading relationship with the custom-
ary land-owning group (Oram, 1976).
However, with the in ux of migrants from
elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, ties with
customary land-owners weakened and more
settlements began to emerge on unoccupied
Crown Land (Oram, 1976). By 1979, 25 per
cent of the indigenous population of Port
Moresby lived in informal settlements
(Matwijiw, 1982); that proportion has subse-
quently grown, being around 40 per cent at
the start of the 1990s (Monsell-Davis, 1993)
and perhaps as much as half at the end of the
century.
The in ux of migrants and the growth of
‘illegal’ settlements provided the impetus for
renewed demands to control mobility and
suggestions that a formal pass system be
introduced. In the lead up to independence,
although it was becoming more widely ac-
cepted by the administration that long-term
settlement of migrants was inevitable, there
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was also unease and, at times, objection to
the expansion of informal urban settlements
(Oram, 1970). Administrators in Port
Moresby, for example, planned to remove all
migrants from customary lands on the
grounds that the settlers had no security of
tenure and the settlements were a “danger to
health” (Oram, 1970, p. 55).
Turning Full Circle in the Post-colonial
Era
Opposition to urbanisation re-emerged more
strongly in the immediate post-colonial pe-
riod as migration to towns increased and
informal settlements expanded. At various
times following independence and through-
out the 1980s, most, if not all, urban authori-
ties sought to evict squatters and/or the
unemployed often under the guise of cleans-
ing the city of criminals, the unemployed and
‘illegal’ occupiers of government and cus-
tomary land. For example, opposition to mi-
grants in the North Solomons Province had
intensi ed to the extent that in 1977 and
1978 groups of squatters had been repatriated
by plane to three Highlands provinces
(Talyaga and Olela, 1978). Two years later,
growing unemployment, urban crime and
larger urban settlements were important is-
sues in Port Moresby and Rabaul, where a
provincial government committee was
preparing a list of East Sepiks who wanted to
return there or who should be sent home. In
October 1979, one councillor called on the
national government both to repatriate unem-
ployed people from Port Moresby to their
home province as a solution to the capital’s
law-and-order problem and to issue the em-
ployed with identi cation cards; the council-
lor argued, in what was to become a frequent
refrain, that
the capital city of PNG should be a clean
and respectable place to live in and should
compare with major cities in other coun-
tries (quoted in Connell, 1985, p. 108).
In a number of different towns in PNG
(alongside rural areas around Rabaul), there
were pressures to repatriate migrants.
While little came of these attempts to
‘clean up’ urban areas, policy responses to-
wards urban migration had quite quickly
come full circle by the end of the 1970s.
Instead of being directed by a colonial ad-
ministration, they were now the preferred
solutions of some provincial governments.
Moreover, whilst some limited attempts were
made to provide housing and improve condi-
tions in urban settlements, the assumptions of
colonial administrators regarding urban set-
tlers appeared to have been inherited by
many post-colonial of cials. That is, urban
migrants were temporary; their rightful place
was the village; and, their presence in town
would lead to moral decay and crime, and a
rise in urban unemployment.
Attempts to deal directly with urban prob-
lems generally lapsed until the 1980s when
provincial governments, especially in island
provinces, once again began to take the ini-
tiative on this issue. The Island Regional
Premiers Conference recommended several
measures to deal with unemployment in the
Islands Region and asked the national
government “to give powers to Provincial
Land Boards to evict squatters on tradition-
ally owned land” (Arawa Bulletin, 3 April
1981). The national government made no
response. Similarly, the North Solomons
province made extensive efforts to remove
squatters and formulate policies to encourage
the employment of local workers rather than
migrants, none of which was ever imple-
mented (Connell, 1985, pp. 111–116). Partic-
ularly high wages in the province (as a result
of mining) and a thriving regional economy
stimulated continued migration; towns there
and elsewhere continued to grow. Despite
frustrations, there were few new attempts at
policy formation or direct repatriation.
Squatters and Crime
In the past decade, opposition to informal
settlements has further intensi ed as law-
and-order problems have escalated sharply in
urban Papua New Guinea. Newspapers regu-
larly portray informal settlements as havens
for the unemployed and criminal gangs. They
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are also commonly blamed for the break-
down in law-and-order and other social prob-
lems occurring in urban areas. Many believe
that crime would diminish if the towns were
closed to those who did not work there or did
not have a ‘valid’ reason for being there.5
Hence, there have been strident calls for the
repatriation of ‘vagrants’ and the ‘unem-
ployed’ to their provinces of origin.
Although accurate criminal justice statis-
tics on the nature and scale of crime are
scarce, a range of evidence points to a rise in
crime and violence in many towns (Dinnen,
2000; Levantis, 2000; Sikani, 2000).6 In Port
Moresby, where most crimes are reported,
statistics on serious crime from May to Octo-
ber 1997 included 33 murders, 31 attempted
murders, 147 cases of rape, 47 cases involv-
ing grievous bodily harm, 44 unlawful
wounding offences and 49 cases of abduction
and kidnapping (Sikani, 2000, p. 41). At a
national level, the annual rate of violent
crime, which increased 20-fold from 1970 to
1990, is about 2000 incidents per 100 000
people— gures that are 10 times higher than
Australia and 6 times that of the nearby
island nation of Fiji—and the probability of
being a victim of crime is higher in Papua
New Guinean urban centres than in such
cities as Kampala, Rio de Janeiro and Johan-
nesburg (Levantis, 2000, pp. 132–133). Fear
of crime is justi ed.
Because law-and-order problems have
grown in many urban areas of Papua New
Guinea—although rural areas have not es-
caped parallel trends—anti-urbanisation sen-
timents can be identi ed in most provincial
administrations and methods of controlling
or discouraging migration have been a prior-
ity of numerous government and provincial
leaders at various times during the past dec-
ade. During the 1990s, often under the guise
of addressing the rapidly rising levels of
urban crime, there have been large-scale
‘squatter’ evictions and attempts at repatri-
ation by provincial authorities in most major
cities and towns. Between 1997 and 1999,
almost every major town in Papua New
Guinea (including Port Moresby, Lae,
Madang, Rabaul, Kokopo, Goroka and
Kimbe) has attempted ‘squatter’ clearances.
Urban evictions and clearances since the
early 1990s have differed in several import-
ant respects from earlier attempts to control
urbanisation. They are now on a larger scale,
more violent and frequently involve alliances
of local land-owners with government au-
thorities and the police. The scale and violent
nature of evictions was evident in Madang in
1997/98 where the attempted eviction of ap-
proximately 8000 settlers represented almost
30 per cent of that city’s 1990 population.
Police from neighbouring provinces were
called in and a total of 300 police were on
stand-by. During the attempted eviction,
many houses were bulldozed and Madang
was declared a ‘Fighting Zone’ for 2 months.
A 3-month liquor ban was also imposed
(Post Courier, 1997h). Three years later,
Madang went through much the same pro-
cesses again.
In early 1998, when the US was bombing
Iraq, the cartoon reproduced in Figure 2 ap-
peared in the local press following calls by
Police Commander Jeffrey Vaki to  ght
crime by clearing all ‘squatter’ settlements in
Port Moresby. The cartoon exempli es the
increasingly heavy-handed approach to urban
problems by provincial authorities and po-
lice. Many recent evictions have involved the
raising and burning of houses, the killing of
domestic animals and the destruction of food
gardens. Urban settlers are being stripped of
their assets to be left homeless (Post Courier,
1997g, 1998a, 1999a; The National , 1999).
Such destructive eviction exercises appear to
serve several purposes. They may be used for
political point-scoring with local land-own-
ers and business interests, to make other
‘squatters’ publicly aware and fearful of the
government’s ‘crack-down’ on crime and il-
legal settlements, and to make such settle-
ments uninhabitable and extremely dif cult
to re-establish. The lack of compassion to-
wards informal settlers and the violent nature
of recent evictions have raised concerns
amongst some community leaders about hu-
man rights violations (Post Courier, 1998a,
1998b, 1999c). Such voices, however, do
little to counter the dominant discourse
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amongst provincial authorities and police
that such settlements are repositories of crim-
inals and the unemployed.
There is no evidence that criminals are
more numerous in settlements, yet it is
widely believed that this is so; hence, the
claims of settlers for  nancial support—
through service schemes and social amenity
provision—are less likely to be met and are
usually routinely rejected. Settlements, un-
employment and crime are discursively
linked by politicians and police spokespeople
and “monotonously repeated in the daily
press” alongside routine contextualisation of
the “inevitable consequences of urban mi-
gration and poverty” (Goddard, 2001, p. 4)
that invariably lacked substance. At the very
least, there is a considerable diversity of
settlements and settlers.
This generally antagonistic approach to the
issue of urbanisation has contributed to an
unwillingness to countenance the upgrading
and acceptance of settlements that might lead
to a reduction of urban problems. For exam-
ple, to discourage migration, infrastructural
costs of urban development have been passed
on to urban consumers in higher electricity
and water charges and, during the 1980s, the
National Housing Commission was in-
structed to do without government subsidies
(Connell, 1997). Such policies tended to
place urban services further beyond the reach
of the majority of the urban population, to an
extent that is much greater than elsewhere in
the Paci c region (Connell and Lea, 2001).
Moreover, there was little effort to under-
stand the circumstances of urban settlers and
the factors contributing to increased urbani-
sation. Violence and destruction have be-
come instruments of urban planning as urban
problems become increasingly complex and
unmanageable.
A disturbing trend in these evictions is the
collaboration of local land-owners with local/
provincial authorities and police in actions to
evict settlers.7 Increasingly, indigenous land-
owners and ethnic groups are seeking
government support to repatriate settlers and/
or are participating directly with of cials in
eviction exercises. For instance, in the March
1999 evictions from the East New Britain
capital of Kokopo, more than 100 men from
the nearby village of Ulagunan assisted po-
lice and of cers from the lands division and
local government to evict over 200 people.
Armed with bush knives, they assisted with
the destruction of settlers’ houses, food gar-
dens, fruit trees and betel nut palms and the
killing of settlers’ pigs, dogs and chickens
(Post Courier, 1999a; 1999b). In another
similar case in March 1999, Central Provin-
cial Governor Ted Diro signed an agreement
with land-owner representatives from Kilak-
ila and Koboka villages near Port Moresby
that granted provincial police the authority to
evict settlers from these village lands (Post
Courier, 1999d). While the agreement gave
back to land-owners control of their land, it
also allowed police to evict squatters from
along the Magi and Hiritano highways which
lead out of Port Moresby (Post Courier,
1999d). A year later, after there had been
attacks on travellers on the highway, Diro
called on the national government to remove
all squatter settlements in the capital (Post
Courier, 2000c).
Such alliances between the state and land-
owners have tended to in ame ethnic ten-
sions, pitting local land-owners against
migrants from distant provinces, which legit-
imises and reinforces of cial antagonism to-
wards settlers and may also provide an ideal
solution for land-owners wishing to manage
their lands differently. Many of the initial
settlers had informal tenancy arrangements
with land-owners and, in some of the earliest
settlements, settlers had long-standing trad-
ing relationships with land-owners (Oram,
1976; Goddard, 1998). These relationships
with customary land-owners and tenancy ar-
rangements are undergoing change in the
new social and economic urban context. Now
that the commercial value of their land has
increased, alliances with state authorities
against settlers may provide land-owners
with the means to realise the potential of
higher commercial land values. The mutually
bene cial relationships now developing be-
tween land-owners and the state can be legit-
imised under the rhetoric of ‘ ghting crime’,
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thus enabling land-owners to repossess now-
valuable commercial land while providing
the state with more effective control over
urban land management.
The rhetoric of responding to crime can be
a subterfuge for the implementation of urban
policies by state authorities. While crime is-
sues were prominent in the justi cation for
the attempted eviction of over 8000 settlers
from Madang in 1997, an of cial from the
Provincial Administrator’s of ce admitted
that
The government decided to take this stand
because of the real shortage of land for
town expansion and the business boom
already taking place (Post Courier,
1997c).
In Madang, some portions of state land titles
occupied by ‘squatters’ had already been li-
censed to businesses for industrial develop-
ment, but progress had stalled because
settlers resisted leaving. At the time, the
Madang Governor, Jim Kas, was reported as
saying that “illegal settlers on land belonging
to the state must pave the way for develop-
ment investors” (Post Courier, 1997e), a
call again repeated there three years later
(Post Courier, 2000d). While the main
eviction exercise became stalled in the
Waigani National Court during 1997 and
1998, Bilia Point settlement containing 70
houses near Madang Harbour was demol-
ished in November 1998 following a court
order sought by a Madang-based company
that had been granted a licence to the land
(Post Courier, 1998g). The ‘war on crime’
rhetoric thus legitimised knee-jerk responses
to urban development issues without the
need for sustained urban planning policies
and strategies.
Alongside these recent attempts at urban
clearances, there have again been several
calls to reintroduce the Vagrancy Act and
other policies to restrict freedom of move-
ment between provinces. At the 1998 Gover-
nor’s Summit in Port Moresby, several
provincial governors proposed that the na-
tional government review and reintroduce the
Vagrancy Act to control rural-to-urban mi-
gration and thus curb rising levels of urban
crime (Post Courier, 1998e). The private
sector has also been urging the government
to address the growth of informal settlements
and the rise in urban crime by reintroducing
the Vagrancy Act and introducing an identity
card system (Post Courier, 1997f), both is-
sues being considered further by the Minister
of Justice in 2000 (Post Courier, 2000a).8
One consequence was an absolute ban being
placed on the construction of new settle-
ments in Port Moresby (a ban that had been
breached within weeks of its implemen-
tation).
These examples illustrate the growing
trend to cast urbanisation and rural–urban
migration as law-and-order problems. Narra-
tives of violence and cleansing the city of
criminals and illegal squatters on state and
customary land are by far the dominant
themes in the discourse of urban manage-
ment and control. With the blurring of crime
and urban issues, urban land management
strategies are now infused with the same
militaristic strategies used in dealing with
crime more generally. Speaking to the Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry and the Papua
New Guinea Chamber of Mines and Pet-
roleum, the NCD/Central Police Comman-
der, Jeffrey Vaki in reference to ‘squatter’
clearances around Port Moresby, described
the police’s role as “ ghting a war” to “clean
up” the city (The National, 1998).
The violent nature of urban management
appears to be part of what Dinnen (1999) has
identi ed as a more general trend in Papua
New Guinea of relying increasingly on mili-
taristic solutions to internal security prob-
lems such as crime and social disorder. For
example, when a police sergeant was slain
during a robbery in Madang, the police retal-
iated by burning and ransacking more than
50 houses and several tradestores in the
settlement in which the alleged offenders
resided (Post Courier, 1997a; 1997b). One
settler said “We are being terrorised at night
by criminals and during the day by police”
(Post Courier, 1997a). A growing reliance
on emergency measures such as states of
emergency, joint police and military opera-
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tions, curfews, special police units and the
regular use of ‘shoot-to-kill’ orders all indi-
cate that violence is increasingly used as a
tool to deal with internal security issues
(Dinnen, 1999).9 These ‘quick  x’ strategies,
Dinnen argues, re ect the weakening of the
state which, in combination with an auto-
cratic leadership style, have had a debilitat-
ing effect on government agencies.
Coercive solutions offer the prospect of
speedier outcomes than those likely to
 ow from protracted negotiations or cum-
bersome bureaucratic processes directed
toward policies addressing underlying
causes (Dinnen, 1999, p. 290).
Thus, there is little space for wider dis-
cussion of issues of urbanisation and devel-
opment within the broader spatial context of
rural and urban change. Issues of urbanisa-
tion and urban development have become
crime issues divorced from their socioeco-
nomic and spatial contexts.
Urban Resident or Rural Visitor?
Another theme in the state discourse on ur-
banisation in Papua New Guinea that serves
to legitimise evictions, and which harks back
to the early colonial period, is the view of the
village as being the rightful place for Papua
New Guineans—a place that offers a cleaner,
more digni ed and more ‘traditional’ way of
life. The rhetoric of self-reliance, dignity and
the village providing a hygienic, productive,
honest and ful lling life is strong in the
discourse of provincial and government lead-
ers
My plan to eject settlers [in Lae] is a
genuine one for the sake of my people
who want a trouble free environment for
their children … As for Papua New
Guinea which has a large area of land, I do
not see why people should move from
province to province. I am sure there are
better things to do in their own villages or
towns (Morobe Premier The Times of
Papua New Guinea, 6 June 1991; quoted
in Connell, 1997, p. 210).
Not surprisingly, this was not the settlers’
perception. At the same time, in Rabaul,
illegal settlers were ordered to be evicted for
similar reasons. The East New Britain Prem-
ier stressed that the exercise was being un-
dertaken for the good of both the province
and the settlers
We want to help the settlers so that they
can have dignity and that they can grow
their own cash crops in their respective
villages. Villages are still the best and
least expensive places to live. Furthermore
we want settlers to understand that they
were not born to be slaves in towns. How-
ever they are making themselves slaves
(The Times of Papua New Guinea, 29
August 1991; quoted in Connell, 1997,
p. 210).
In another example, Police Chief Geoffrey
Vaki, referring to squatters in illegal settle-
ments in Port Moresby and elsewhere, said
that
Papua New Guinea was oriented on
Melanesian traditions of subsistence farm-
ing and wantok system, and there should
be no excuse for people seeking land for
resettlement. I don’t think people should
live in such undigni ed conditions as
Baruni and the old parliament since we
have vast land back in the villages where
people can resettle and make gar-
dens. … Our ancestors never lived in bac-
teria-infested areas and we are a country
proud of our cultural heritage. No one
should tell me they have no place to reset-
tle (Post Courier, 1998d).
In 2000, all Members of Parliament from
outside Port Moresby were urged to
“encourage their [sic] unemployed people to
return home and start projects in their
provinces” (Post Courier, 2000b). These
kinds of statement emphasise the view that
the urban migrant’s ‘real’ home is the village
where a communal, subsistence lifestyle pro-
vides for a wholesome existence. This wide-
spread constructed view of an idyllic rural
life, a 20th century ‘merrie Melanesia’,
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allows the urban migrant to be portrayed as
temporarily out of place and in an environ-
ment lacking the traditions, morals and posi-
tive societal values of rural communities.
Thus the urban migrant is prone to all the
negative consequences of an urban life—a
squalid, morally impoverished existence and
crime-ridden lifestyle. The task then is a
moral one, to remove these people from the
urban landscape by encouraging them to re-
turn home to lead ‘ful lling’ and productive
lives.
Back to the Land?
The assumption that migrants can return
‘home’ is highly questionable for several
reasons. Periods of urban residence are in-
creasing as many more people are born in
town and no longer maintain exchange rela-
tionships with ‘home’. Further, and unac-
knowledged by government, economic
conditions in many rural areas are worsening
such that it would be extremely dif cult, if
not impossible, for many migrants to re-es-
tablish themselves and their families in their
‘home’ villages. We examine each of these
points below.
The assumption that people are temporary
urban residents fails to recognise the chang-
ing context of rural-to-urban migration in
Papua New Guinea. Migration to towns is
increasingly characterised by long-term fam-
ily migration and not by short-term circular
migration of young single males. More bal-
anced sex ratios in town suggest a more
permanent and stable urban population—
trends that were apparent by the 1971
census. Although in-migration remains a
signi cant component of urban growth in
Papua New Guinea (Connell and Lea, 1993),
natural increase is slowly assuming greater
importance in the growth of informal settle-
ments.
The assertion that contemporary urban set-
tlers are temporary sojourners in the urban
landscape also fails to recognise the very
long time many of these settlements have
been in existence, and that many residents
have now lived most, if not all, of their lives
in towns and cities. Growing numbers of
residents in informal settlements and towns
are second- or third-generation urbanites
with few if any ties to their ‘home’ villages
and, therefore, have limited opportunities
beyond the town or city (Oram, 1970; Zim-
merman, 1973; Townsend, 1977; Morauta
and Ryan, 1982; Connell, 1985; Ryan, 1993;
Kaitilla, 1994; Ward, 1998). In the late
1970s, Garnaut et al., (1977) recognised that
around a quarter of the children born in Port
Moresby, Lae and Rabaul had never visited
their village ‘homes’. In a study conducted
in the early 1980s, over half of the Toaripi
(Gulf) migrants in Nine-Mile, Port Moresby,
had never lived in ‘their village’, had none
of the ‘survival skills’ for village life (or
land or close kin there) and hence were
likely to remain urban residents (Chao,
1985). More recently, many of the residents
involved in the 1997 Madang evictions had
been living there for 40 years or more. Their
commitment to urban living was evident in
the fact that they had begun to bury their
dead in town rather than sending the corpses
‘home’ for burial.10 In the lead up to the
evictions, they petitioned the government
for cof ns so that the exhumed remains of
deceased relatives could be returned to their
home villages for reburial (Post Courier,
1997d).
Long-term demographic trends in Papua
New Guinea invalidate assertions that people
are temporary sojourners who can return
home. The 1973/74 urban surveys in Papua
New Guinea  rst introduced the concept of
‘dispossession’ amongst urban residents; the
‘dispossessed’ being those who lacked access
to the resources of the village economy,
mainly because of insuf cient tenure rights
(Garnaut et al., 1977). Other studies at the
time, and more recently, have reported the
growth of an ‘urban proletariat’ comprised of
permanent migrants to towns dependent on
wage employment (for a summary, see Con-
nell, 1985, pp. 97–98; Ryan, 1989). Much of
the urban proletariat lack a subsistence
alternative to urban employment either due
to their villages being absorbed into expand-
ing urban areas, or because they had in-
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suf cient resources to enable them to main-
tain close ties with home. The most vulner-
able migrant groups, with few opportunities
to access resources at ‘home’, are from poor
regions: they lack capital for travel, cannot
distribute money and gifts in rural areas and
hence must retain their commitment to a
precarious urban existence (Connell and Lea,
1993, 1994). Many informal urban settle-
ments in contemporary Papua New Guinea
are made up of growing numbers of the
urban dispossessed and an urban proletariat
who no longer have access to village land
and have few, if any, ties to their ‘home’
villages.
Ties with ‘home’, especially the mainte-
nance of indigenous exchange relationships,
are very important for the resumption of
village resource rights for returning migrants.
Migrants who, for whatever reasons, do not
maintain these exchange relationships during
their absence or fail to ful l social obliga-
tions risk foregoing access rights to land and
other resources (see Garnaut et al., 1977;
Morauta, 1981; Curtain, 1980; Morauta and
Ryan, 1982; Carrier and Carrier, 1989; Curry
and Koczberski, 1999). When Member of
Parliament for Moresby South, Lady Carol
Kidu, helped to repatriate a group of 42
young men from Two Mile Hill settlement,
she sent a settlement leader with them to
explain to villagers that these young men did
not have money with them to distribute at
‘home’. She requested that the villagers ac-
cept them as they were (Post Courier,
1998h). Often, however, these people join
the ranks of the ‘urban dispossessed’
(Morauta and Ryan, 1982). A recent example
was the evacuation of 8000 Sepiks following
the 1994 Rabaul volcanic eruption (Neu-
mann, 1997). Many evacuees found they
were unwelcome in their home villages and
some found their land had been taken over
by others. Village relatives often asked “Why
should we give you food or let you sleep in
our house … after all you never thought of us
when you lived in comfort in Rabaul”—a
reference to their perceived failure to ful l
exchange obligations. The majority of those
repatriated had returned to East New Britain
by the beginning of 1996. After years of
village absence, they had become ‘foreign-
ers’ in their home villages and ‘home’ was
now Rabaul.
Thus, while some urban migrants may
return home, for many of them, and es-
pecially the poorest, the return option is too
dif cult, or impossible, even if it were
sought. Such urban residents are in a very
vulnerable position given the growing intol-
erance of urban settlers. They may have little
alternative but to join the ranks of the urban
dispossessed, constantly threatened by evic-
tion and harassment by the state authorities
with the tacit or active support of local land-
owners. Their dire predicament is re ected
in the words of one resident whose house
and belongings were destroyed in the 1999
evictions in Lae.
We have lived here for more than 15
years; our children were born here; some
have married and are living with their
families here. We do not know where to
go and we do not know where we are
going to sleep tonight now that our homes
have been burnt to the ground (The Na-
tional, 1999).
The growing pool of dispossessed urban set-
tlers is evident in many of the recent evic-
tions in Papua New Guinea where evicted
settlers have attempted to re-establish them-
selves at the same site after the eviction or
have surfaced at other urban settlements. For
instance, in the October 1999 evictions in
Lae in which up to 100 families were
evicted, one settler claimed that this was the
third time that their houses had been burnt
down and their property destroyed (The Na-
tional, 1999). Following the Kokopo evic-
tions in early March 1999, Rabaul’s acting
town manager, Ephraim Wartoro, reported a
sudden in ux of ‘squatters’ to Rabaul. Many
of these arrivals had originally moved to
Kokopo after the 1994 volcanic eruption in
Rabaul and now were returning to Rabaul
after their eviction from Kokopo
There is a reported heavy presence of set-
tlers at Torch Bearer [Rabaul], and we
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cannot single out any group, but we be-
lieve these were the same people who left
Rabaul during the eruptions, went to
Kokopo and are now coming back
(Wartoro; cited in Post Courier, 1999d).
Following the 1994 evictions of 2000 people
in Rabaul, the neighbouring West New
Britain authorities were concerned about the
large numbers of evicted people seeking ref-
uge in West New Britain (Post Courier,
1994). In 1998, blockholders at Poro resettle-
ment scheme in West Sepik urged the
Lands Department to release and sub-divide
further land to accommodate people dis-
placed by evictions from settlements and
towns in West New Britain, Rabaul, Madang
and other urban centres (Post Courier,
1998c; 1999e). Evictions thus pose a burden
for other nearby urban centres (where these
exist), for ‘home’ areas (where land is
scarce) but, above all, for the urban residents
themselves.
Rural Migration
The expectation that evictions and other
policies of controlling migration will
signi cantly stem the  ow of migrants to
urban areas, or encourage people to return to
their home villages, ignores on-going prob-
lems in rural areas, especially issues of land-
lessness, marginalisation and the growing
economic disparities between urban and rural
Papua New Guinea. As a World Bank report
recognised almost 20 years ago
Much of the migrant population in urban
settlements originates in provinces with
either relatively high population densities
or relatively low agricultural potential or
both. It is dif cult to see how these areas
can be developed suf ciently and rapidly
enough to reduce migrant  ows
signi cantly and, furthermore, the cost of
developing these regions may well be
above the cost of development elsewhere
in the country and will, therefore, run into
signi cant trade-off problems (World
Bank, 1981, p. 9; quoted in Connell, 1985,
p. 95).
In the subsequent two decades, rural condi-
tions in many parts of Papua New Guinea
have deteriorated and rural and urban dis-
parities have increased. Many rural people,
for example, still do not have adequate ac-
cess to a regular income, health services,
schools or road networks and transport fa-
cilities. For example, health services have
been deteriorating since the 1980s. Since
1990, half of all rural aid posts have closed
because of staff shortages and the lack of
essential medical supplies. In the mid
1990s, the Minister for Health reported that
60 per cent of health facilities in the
provinces were closed, unstaffed or had no
medicines or equipment (Connell, 1997).
The effects of these closures are re ected in
a sharp rise in infant mortality rates. For
instance, in Eastern Highlands Province, the
infant mortality rate increased from 55 per
1000 livebirths in 1980 to 100 in 1994
(Duke, 1999). Hence, urban– rural inequali-
ties are widening and rural Papua New
Guinea is characterised by high infant
mortality rates, low educational levels
and incomes and poor standards of living
(Table 3).
Growing socioeconomic inequalities be-
tween rural and urban areas will continue to
fuel migration from poor and densely popu-
lated rural areas as rural villagers seek to
escape rural poverty and, increasingly,
landlessness (Curry and Koczberski, 1999).
Attempts to curtail or reverse migration
 ows from rural areas, especially from de-
pressed rural regions, will therefore be ex-
tremely dif cult. As Marion Ward succinctly
stated in reference to urbanisation in the
1960s: “to attempt to stem the  ow of urban
migration is … an exercise in Canutian
logic” (Ward, 1970, p. 53). Policies aimed at
controlling rural-to-urban migration are un-
likely to succeed because they fail to recog-
nise the role and resilience of social and
kinship networks in facilitating migration
(Curry and Koczberski, 1998). Such net-
works lessen risks associated with migration
as new arrivals in towns and cities can an-
ticipate support and assistance from kin. One
of the key elements of these networks is
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Table 3. Urban– rural disparities in Papua New Guinea, 1996
Unit Urban Rural
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 births) Number 33.7 86.6
Households connected to electricity Percentage 59.2 3.2
Population with no formal education Percentage 24.4 50.5
Households possessing a motor vehicle Percentage 19.9 1.4
Real minimum wages (1977 prices)a Kina pw 25 9
a Figures are for 1992.
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea (1998, p. 14)
their capacity to sustain population  ows
independently of objective economic con-
ditions at origin and destination. They can
operate largely outside the arena of policy
makers, and thus migration  ows along
networks are notoriously dif cult to
in uence by policy intervention, let alone
to stop. Almost all past attempts to prevent
such movements have failed. The net-
works are enormously resilient, even in the
face of the most vigorous and draconian
actions of governments. Hence, once es-
tablished, they become very strong forces
for perpetuating streams of movements
(Hugo, 1997, p. 282).
Consequently, attempts to reverse rural–ur-
ban migration in African and Asian countries
have thus similarly failed as they  y in the
face of contexts where the decentralisation of
economic activity has been dif cult if not
impossible, rural development schemes have
been poorly implemented through lack of
administrative resources and con icts be-
tween state and regional authorities and eth-
nic tensions have surfaced (Riddell, 1978;
Peek and Standing, 1979; Standing, 1979;
Connell, 1987). Few schemes have been im-
plemented in recent years.
Widening economic disparities between
urban and rural Papua New Guinea mean that
the pressures to migrate will continue to
build despite the ‘Canutian logic’ of current
attempts to stem urbanisation. Increasing
numbers of rural villagers have little option
but to accept the risk of a precarious urban
existence. Many of these people will  nd
themselves swelling the ranks of the urban
dispossessed, as an increasingly alienated
and discontented group. Narratives of viol-
ence and the clean city, the discursive strate-
gies of élite opposition to the grassroots,
mark such settlers with their rural origins, as
being much like those in shantytowns else-
where
a kind of modern-day plague, an unruly
cancerous growth, an infectious epidemic
in icted on the once healthy and sound
social body of the community (Scheper-
Hughes, 1992, p. 94; quoted in Goddard,
2001, pp. 3–4).
Conclusion
Urbanisation has continued unabated despite
an entrenched anti-urbanism through most of
the colonial and post-colonial periods, and
there is no indication that urban growth will
falter in the foreseeable future. Recent at-
tempts to  nd solutions to urban growth and
rural-to-urban migration have focused almost
entirely on harsh punitive measures as urban-
isation is increasingly represented as a law-
and-order issue. However, authoritarian or
coercive controls on migration address some
symptoms of urbanisation (crime, unemploy-
ment and the development of illegal settle-
ments), rather than the causes of resource
misallocation and regional economic dispari-
ties (Oberai, 1979, p. 242). Two decades ago,
Denoon observed that
The attraction of closed towns is very
obvious … With one bound we rid our-
selves of poverty, ignorance and disease;
modern towns shed their nasty reminders
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of underdevelopment … Closed towns
are the millennial dream of the property-
owning, rate-paying middle class (De-
noon, 1980, p. 283).
Denoon has reviewed the rationale for clos-
ing Papua New Guinean towns and con-
cluded, by analogy, that
urban problems may be the manifestation
of rural underdevelopment [so that] the
mere closure of the towns will merely
complicate the problem by obscuring it
(Denoon, 1980, p. 288).
Closing towns would therefore be more
likely to worsen rural poverty and stress
rural–urban inequalities. Squatters are part of
an entrenched constituency in post-colonial
Melanesia that cannot be sorted out by at-
tempts at social engineering of a kind that
might have been possible in former times. To
advocate repatriation is to assume, erro-
neously, that the social, political and institu-
tional means are present. These modern fears
and concerns have contributed substantially
to limited interest in and expenditure on the
poorest parts of cities.
Despite of cial concerns over the manage-
ment of urbanisation, alongside an expressed
focus on rural development, there have been
few genuine attempts to plan urban develop-
ment adequately by, for example, encourag-
ing the growth of small rather than large
towns, which might provide alternative
growth centres and enable more ef cient
market systems. Similarly, there has been
widespread opposition to the growth of infor-
mal-sector economic activities even includ-
ing markets, rather than perceiving this as a
means of contributing to resolving urban
employment problems (Connell, 1997;
Levantis, 2000). Even if some violent evic-
tions have been partly successful in stem-
ming the  ow of migrants into the cities or
encouraging some urban people to return to
their rural villages, the underlying problems
remain. A ‘bulldozer’ approach to informal
urban settlements has not stemmed the  ow
of migrants, particularly from economically
depressed rural areas. Hence, governments
must acknowledge contemporary rural and
urban conditions in Papua New Guinea, that
now involve the existence of large numbers
of second- and third-generation urbanites
without access to village land, the inaccessi-
bility of formal-sector housing to many ur-
ban residents, the large and expanding pool
of urban dispossessed and the likelihood of a
continual  ow of the rural disadvantaged to
urban areas. These trends are now en-
trenched, and the use of state violence to
address urban ‘problems’ merely creates fur-
ther dissent and alienation, and destabilises
the state’s already fragile social and econ-
omic infrastructure. Without more sensitive
urban and rural policies, recent draconian
responses to urbanisation are of limited
utility.
The increasing use of violence, not only as
a tool to manage urbanisation but more gen-
erally to address the country’s development
problems, has been recognised by observers
as re ecting a weakening state capacity to
deal with social, political and economic is-
sues, especially problems related to internal
dissent (Dinnen, 1999; O’Collins, 2000). It
also re ects the limited capacity of a weak
state to achieve ‘desired’ policy outcomes,
primarily the generation of employment op-
portunities and service provision (despite an
urban bias in resource allocation). Violent
raids of short duration on informal settle-
ments are easier than formulating complex
policies relating to urban planning or policies
that address the causes of urbanisation—such
as resource misallocation, rural poverty and
regional economic disparities. Ironically dra-
matic, code-named police raids and the spor-
adic evictions of settlers serve no wider
purpose “than a show of governmental and
police competence in the struggle to achieve
law-and-order” (Goddard, 2001, p. 25) that is
at variance with both the location of crime
and criminals and the weakness of the state
in its inability to stimulate economic and
social development. Moreover, they also
pander to entrenched urban interests, thus
emphasising intraurban inequalities. The re-
liance on a range of ‘quick- x’ solutions that
increasingly involve state-sponsored violence
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is leading to a situation where people are
coming into repeated con ict with a range of
state institutions. Hence, there is very real
potential for a serious breakdown of civil
society in particular areas of Papua New
Guinea. Indeed, potential  ashpoints
include not only urban areas, but all areas
where there have been high levels of mi-
gration—mine sites, plantations and land
settlement schemes (notably those based
on export cash crops like oil palm) where
different cultural groups reside on alienated
land. The sharpening of ethnic identities
now occurring at such sites of high in-
migration appears to be embedded within
broader processes of socioeconomic change
that are contributing to the tensions now
surfacing between land-owners and settlers
in different parts of Melanesia, including Fiji
and Solomon Islands (where recent political
violence has ensued). Urbanisation, without
adequate policy formation, has entrenched
cultural division, emphasised established
ethnic identities, fostered intraurban in-
equality, exacerbated social problems in
growing urban centres and hampered the
task of stimulating economic and social
development.
Notes
1. First estimates from the 2000 census of the
populations of Papua New Guinea’s two
largest cities, Port Moresby and Lae, put
them at around 245 000 and 120 000 respect-
ively.
2. The indigenous population of Port Moresby
before 1942 consisted of inhabitants of urban
villages which were outside the town
boundary and migrant workers who resided
in accommodation provided by their employ-
ers (Oram, 1970).
3. At the 1971 census, there were only two
towns in Papua New Guinea with popula-
tions over 20 000 (Connell, 1997), and less
than 10 per cent of the population lived in
towns and cities in the early 1970s.
4. For example, the Vagrancy Act was enforced
at least as recently as 1973.
5. It has been estimated that 15 per cent of the
urban workforce in Papua New Guinea earn
a livelihood through criminal activity. The
average earnings of those engaged in crimi-
nal activities tend to be higher than those of
people in unskilled formal employment
(Levantis, 1997).
6. A critical problem with crime statistics in
Papua New Guinea is that most crimes com-
mitted are not reported in criminal justice
statistics or police records; statistics have not
been publicly released since 1990 (Dinnen,
2000; Levantis, 2000). Similarly, although
several observers report a rise in the use of
police  rearms and military weapons in
criminal activities and a greater incidence of
unprovoked violence from the police, no re-
liable  gures are available.
7. While crime issues may legitimise the evic-
tion of settlers, many of the con icts be-
tween settlers and land-owners appear to be
embedded within broader ethnic tensions
now surfacing between land-owners and set-
tlers in different parts of Melanesia (for ex-
ample, Fiji and Solomon Islands). To date,
there has been little research on these ten-
sions in urban Papua New Guinea, but recent
events on informal urban settlements and
resettlement schemes in West New Britain
and Popondetta reveal that tensions between
land-owners and migrants are set within
complex historical and political backgrounds
that will not be resolved easily (Curry and
Koczberski, 1999).
8. The Post Courier (1998f) reported a motion
put to Parliament to control urban drift into
Port Moresby. The motion failed to be
passed by the majority of members.
9. According to the Melbourne Sunday Age
(2000) the Papua New Guinea government is
considering combining the Defence and Po-
lice forces by establishing a single paramili-
tary unit.
10. The spirits of the deceased are believed to
play an important role in the lives of their
living kin and, therefore, burial sites must
not be too far from the settlements of living
kin.
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